The Historian Who Sold Out: James Bryce and the Bryce Report by Ryley, Jameson
Volume 1 | Issue 2 ( 2008) pps. 60-85
The Historian Who Sold Out: James Bryce and the
Bryce Report
Jameson Ryley
University of Iowa
Copyright © 2008 Jameson Ryley
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Iowa Research Online. It has been accepted for inclusion in Iowa Historical Review by an
authorized administrator of Iowa Research Online. For more information, please contact lib-ir@uiowa.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ryley, Jameson (2008) "The Historian Who Sold Out: James Bryce and the Bryce Report," Iowa Historical Review: Vol. 1: Iss. 2: 60-85.
https://doi.org/10.17077/2373-1842.1011
The Historian Who Sold Out: James Bryce and the Bryce Report 
 
Jameson Ryley* 
 
 
He did not know her name, 
but he knew that she worked 
in the Fiction Department. 
– George Orwell, 1984 
  
  
In the early days of the First World War, there was clamor for the British 
government to investigate what had occurred in 1914 Belgium.  The project was 
first developed by Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, who on January 22, 1915 gave 
vague instructions to the leader of the War Propaganda Bureau (WPB), Charles 
Masterman, to investigate “alleged outrages, the maltreatment of civilians, and 
breaches of law and established usages of war.”1 The WPB was first created on 
September 2, 1914, and the prime minister considered Masterman as a wonderful 
choice to head the department because he was a renowned writer and journalist. 
The report that Asquith wanted would be presided over by James Bryce, the world 
famous historian and former member of Parliament who is the subject of this 
chapter.  Masterman knew that Bryce’s reputation would not lead to further 
questioning of the report’s objectivity, and that Bryce was therefore the perfect 
person to preside over and subsequently pen what would become The Committee 
on Alleged German Outrages, published on May 13, 1915.  
But who was James Bryce, and why was his report on the Belgian 
outrages considered so professional?  The majority of information about Bryce 
comes from his writing career as an intellectual and a member of Parliament, and 
from his biography, which was published in 1927 by a colleague, H.A.L. Fisher. 
Fisher was a member of the Bryce Committee in 1915, and his biography on 
Bryce showed that he was the admirer of the famous historian. One of the main 
purposes of this thesis therefore is to provide a more accurate and critical view of 
Bryce than was presented by his admirer Fisher.    
Bryce was born in Belfast, Ireland on May 10, 1839, where he would 
spend his early years living with his grandparents. The sources suggest that Bryce 
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 did not come from an affluent family, but the seeds of intellectualism were set in 
place for the young boy. His father had graduated from Glasgow University in 
1828, and his mother was known as an intellectual because of all of the literature 
she enjoyed from her father’s personal library.  At the young age of eight he 
moved to Glasgow, Scotland, where his father was a Presbyterian minister.2  
During his childhood, Bryce received a comprehensive education from his father 
in the tenets and dogma of the United Presbyterian Church.3  
Bryce left Glasgow in 1857 for the University of Oxford4 where he 
became a successful law student, even acquiring fame as an author of an historical 
piece on the Holy Roman Empire’s laws that won the prestigious Arnold Prize.  
By winning this award, he was recognized by many in intellectual communities as 
an emerging historian of the Holy Roman Empire and the Roman system of law.5  
At Oxford he also furthered his childhood interest in German, which led 
him to travel to Heidelberg in the summer of 1863 to study law with the famous 
German professor Karl Adolph von Vangerow.  At the time, German was the fad 
in the intellectual circles of Europe because of the prestige of German research 
universities and the phenomenal work of such German intellectuals as Goethe, 
Schiller, Kant and Hegel. Bryce used his time in Germany to become well 
acquainted with German writings for his own aesthetic purposes.6  He fell in love 
with Heidelberg, where he was able to build several personal friendships that 
would profit him for the rest of his life and cultivate an enthusiasm for German 
culture.  Throughout his life, Bryce continued to declare that the happiest 
recollection of his life was when he lived in Heidelberg.7 All of this makes it 
more difficult to understand why he would eventually write a major propaganda 
work against Germany in 1915. 
                                                
In 1880, after several years of practicing law, traveling, and working on 
intellectual pursuits, Bryce decided to become a member of the House of 
Commons. At the age of forty-one, Bryce was elected into Parliament from the 
London borough Tower of Hamlets, and he remained there for the next twenty-six 
years.9  During his political career as a follower of William Gladstone, he would 
champion several of the Liberal Party’s causes such as Home Rule for Ireland. 
His few speeches in Parliament were candid and considered right-minded, despite 
the popular opinion that he did not have the stentorian voice that one needed to be 
a successful orator in the House of Commons.  In fact, many within the House of 
Commons considered him to be too academic and professorial for the position, an 
appraisal demonstrated by an offer to be the History Chair at Cambridge.10 In his 
early years of political life, Bryce had been drawn on grounds of both historical 
interest and political sympathy towards Lord Acton, and it was Acton who 
advised Bryce to accept the position at Cambridge.  Perhaps Bryce should have 
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 accepted this offer, since many of his colleagues believed that his parliamentarian 
duties would conflict with his already preoccupied intellectual mind.11  
Indubitably, they were correct.  After only a few years, his political profession 
became a peripheral issue as he focused on other pursuits. 
One of these pursuits was writing for the liberal New York Weekly as a 
political journalist.  He was well known in the US for extensively writing about 
the US election of 1884 between Grover Cleveland and James G. Blaine.  Before 
long, this writing developed into an interest in the American system of 
government, US-British relations, and the engaging question of why the two 
countries had not fought a war since 1812.12  To try to answer the last question, 
Bryce visited the US in 1870 and the autumn of 1881, when he left for a four-
month trip in only his second year as an MP. When he visited once more a year 
later, he started research for a book on American democracy – work that took him 
throughout the country and earned him many friends.  His friends ranked among 
America’s elite: lawyers, politicians, captains of industry, journalists, and even 
the psychologist William James.13 
These growing connections became solidified once his book about 
American democracy was finally completed. The two-volume book was entitled 
American Commonwealth (1888) and contained a novel notion of how the US 
government successfully worked with branches of governments at the federal, 
state, and local levels.14 Signs suggest that Thomas Fleming was correct when he 
pointed out in his book, The Illusion of Victory, that Bryce’s work was well taken 
internationally and made him into a well-known historian.15 In fact, it became so 
famous that he drew comparisons with, and was only outmatched by, Alexis de 
Toqueville’s book, Democracy in America, as the best study on American 
democracy during the nineteenth century.16 After the success of this book, it 
would have been difficult to name a more accomplished or admired historian in 
the English-speaking world than Bryce. 
Writing success engendered several honorary doctorates from American 
and German Universities, and he was even presented with the Pour le Mérite from 
Kaiser Wilhelm II, the highest honor which the Kaiser could bestow.17  Moreover, 
Bryce attained larger visibility within the US, especially within intellectual 
communities and universities.  It was said that “everyone in America had heard of 
him, and that few intellectuals could have escaped reading him.”18 Keeping in 
mind such critical acclaim, it is no surprise that Bryce was offered the position of 
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 US ambassador in 1907 by the new Liberal government. He was delighted with 
the opportunity, accepting the offer with alacrity. 
The appointment was viewed by the British government as an 
irreproachable triumph. Because of his knowledge of American affairs, his 
numerous friendships, and his sympathy for the American way of life, the British 
expected that he would produce successful contributions to the good feelings 
between the two nations.19 Bryce was called a “natural American”20 by those who 
knew him in England, and he entered Washington, D.C. already well acquainted 
with the US President, Teddy Roosevelt.  Bryce had followed Roosevelt’s 
political career closely while writing for the New York Weekly, and he and his 
wife had had the honor of dining with Roosevelt and his family in the White 
House in the autumn of 1901. 
In 1909, his fly-fishing friend and boss, the British Foreign Secretary 
Edward Grey, gave him leave from Washington to write a report on South 
American affairs. The British government, and especially the foreign office, had 
an acute interest in “obscure” hinterlands, and it was believed that Bryce would be 
the perfect person to write a report on the construction of the Panama Canal 
because of his linguistic skills.23 But this South American wandering was not 
limited to this particular trip, as when he was not working in the US, he continued 
to satisfy his penchant for travel by accepting invitations to speak in different 
parts of the US.24  Once again Bryce built up a stronger base of friends within the 
US, as his erudition allowed him to ingratiate himself among several university 
presidents, including Woodrow Wilson at the University of Virginia. His major 
contributions as an ambassador preceded him, garnering him a reputation 
wherever he went in the US. 
After six years abroad, Bryce returned to London in 1913, when Ireland 
was still the major issue of the day.  But this time, Bryce’s title as a Viscount – 
awarded in 1913 for his service and historical writings – allowed him to vote and 
influence policy in the House of Lords, and he became a major advocate of Irish 
Home Rule.25 Furthermore, since he was born in Belfast and raised as a Scottish 
Presbyterian, he was probably one of the most unlikely to fight for Home Rule, 
but he felt that some concessions on Ireland should be made in London. He was 
tired of the injustice meted out to the Irish Nonconformists, and he felt that Home 
Rule was the only way in which the Irish question could be handled.  Just as the 
Irish debate seemed as if it was going to lead to civil war, the outbreak of war 
swept throughout Europe. 
As mentioned, Bryce had fond memories of his studies and travels in 
Heidelberg, but the outbreak of the First World War had a powerful effect on him 
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 that overruled these memories.  He was shocked by the outbreak of hostilities, and 
his immediate reaction, which would last throughout the war, was that Germany 
was at fault for breaking its neutrality with Belgium.  To explain his change of 
mind against Germany, it can be argued that he was always inclined to peaceful 
solutions.  In a letter to James Ford Rhodes, dated August 1, 1914, Bryce reacted 
to Europe’s decision to go to war as being “the most tremendous and horrible 
calamity that has ever befallen mankind.”26  But Germany’s decision to attack 
Belgium incited Bryce’s strong nationalist sentiments, since he felt that the 
culpability for the July crisis was on Germany and its ally, Austria.  He reasoned 
that the violation of a small country’s neutrality by a Great Power required 
Britain’s defense, and, therefore, that Britain needed to take a stand against such a 
flagrant transgression of elementary morality.27  
In fact, he became so fixated on Germany’s action against Belgium that he 
decided that the war should continue until the Prussian military was irreparably 
crushed.  This was a passion demonstrated by his letters, in which he wrote that:  
           
 Britain was fighting against the doctrine that 
treaties may be broken whenever it was to the 
interest of the stronger power to break them,  
against the doctrine that whatever is necessary 
becomes thereby permissible, against that terrible 
application of the doctrine which seizes innocent 
citizens and treats them as hostages for the good 
behavior of others, whom they cannot control.28  
 
Further claims about his passion could be defended: perhaps he was upset over 
the outbreak of hostilities because he noticed that few people in Britain were 
upset about Germany’s decision to break its neutrality with Belgium.  And, 
invariably, disappointed that no protest had been made “against such a flagrant 
breach of public law as an invasion of Belgium.”29 This change of opinion on 
Germany led to his willingness to accept a job from the Propaganda War Bureau 
at Wellington House, which was the home of the British propaganda during the 
First World War. 
Germany’s decision brought Bryce into the war as the chairman to lead the 
British committee on the 1914 Belgian outrages. With such strong 
preconceptions, it is no wonder that he was willing to accept Masterman’s offer to 
write a report.  However, these preconceptions were not his only reasons: it is said 
he had felt like an outsider for his entire life by being a devoted religious 
Nonconformist, and that he felt that he owed it to the government to write the 
report as the project of a lifetime. All of these reasons eventually culminated in 
Bryce’s decision to head the project when he was approached by the attorney 
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 general, offering on behalf of the prime minister, to write the report as a patriotic 
assignment.30   
He was also approached because of his US popularity, where the report 
would attempt to have the widest influence.  His assertions, no matter how 
misleading, would be taken seriously in the US because of his credentials, and the 
sway that he might produce in such neutral countries was tantalizing for 
government officials desperate for transatlantic support.   
Asquith’s committee was rounded out by several other prestigious 
members with voluminous credentials. Four were knights, including Sir Frederick 
Pollock, Sir Edward Clarke, Sir Kenelm E. Digby, and Sir Alfred Hopkinson, and 
two were writers, H.A.L. Fisher and Clarke. The last member was Harold Cox, an 
editor of the Edinburgh Review.  It was this report that he and his fellow members 
were willing to lend their time, which would attempt to be the most objective 
report on the subject of what happened in Belgium.  This was the initial belief, but 
Bryce continually moved toward playing the role of willing propagandist as the 
project continued. 
Since Bryce wrote so that the enemy nation would be internationally 
besmirched and that his nation’s soldiers would be saved, he is the paradigmatic 
propagandist writer.  And as historian Gary Messinger has observed, he was not a 
“full-blown” propagandist from the onset, but it seems that the longer he worked 
on the atrocity report, the more he substantiated a need to help his nation’s 
cause.31 This appears to be correct; Fisher mentions that Bryce had only taken the 
job when first offered because of his belief in the rights of small countries and 
that Germany’s breach of Belgium’s neutrality was a flagrant transgression.32 His 
motivation is partly guesswork, but it might be partially explained by the British 
ethos that they could fight the Germans with their words.  Journalists, authors, 
poets, and pamphleteers were not enlisted in Britain’s military, but they still felt 
like they could use their “paper bullets” to fight the Central Powers.  Bryce must 
have felt similarly, too. 
 As will be seen in the upcoming chapters, these “paper bullets” did, in 
fact, materialize.  The goal will be to show that the report was tendentious, that it 
had a powerful effect on the minds of the citizens of neutral countries, and would 
serve to turn opinion internationally against Germany. Before summarizing what 
Bryce wrote in his propaganda pamphlet and its influence, attention must now be 
shifted toward an explanation of what actually occurred in Belgium. 
 
Man Hat Geschossen! –Someone shot! 
 
 The beginning of the story starts with the Schlieffen plan, which ordered 
the German armies to march into Belgium, a neutral nation by treaty ever since 
1839. Schlieffen knew that the movement of his army through Belgium would 
most likely upset Britain enough to bring them into the war.  Schlieffen 
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 hubristically welcomed the landing of the small British army, and despite the 
illegality of this action, it had its reasons: the massive German army needed the 
flat plains of Flanders to ensure the offensive movements of their massive army.  
This territory had been referred to as “a rag doll for their stronger neighbors to 
squabble over”1 ever since the time of Julius Caesar  – even the Battle of 
Waterloo had been fought there – and Schlieffen surmised no differently since it 
was perfect terrain for offensive movements.   
 So Schlieffen’s answer to Germany’s strategic position was to have his 
armies envelop the French before the Russian armies could mobilize against the 
German borders. He felt that a Blitzkrieg march through Luxembourg, Belgium, 
and the Netherlands would be necessary for a quick victory. This march would 
allow his armies to outflank the recently constructed French fortresses along the 
Franco-German borders, and, it was the only option open to the German army to 
solve the conundrum of having to fight on at least two fronts.  
 The German war plan was constricted by time limits because of the 
threat of the Russian armies in the east, which was a predicament engendered by 
the Franco-Russian military alliance of 1892/4.  Schlieffen also hoped that the 
French would march into the annexed territories of 1871, Alsace and Lorraine, so 
as to give his massively assembled right wing the ability to outflank the French 
forces in a movement that would be very similar to a revolving door that pivoted 
in Brussels.  
  None of this is surprising to historians contextualizing his beliefs: 
Schlieffen was a military historian, who did not believe in a facile victory against 
Russia.  He thought that the Russians would use their enormous landmass to 
continually retreat into their interior, coaxing the Germans into a trap that would 
not end in a quick or decisive victory, but rather a crushing counter attack. He 
also believed that the Russian weather would be dangerous for his armies, in case 
of an extended war.  He thought that the autumn rains would bog down his armies 
and that the weather climate would be harsh.  His plan of defense in the east 
depended on using the Mansurian Lakes as a natural defensive which would 
divide the Russian army, and would buy his western armies enough time to defeat 
the French before having to shift troops from the fronts accordingly.  This, he 
thought, would be the surest way toward a victory.2 
 But the Schlieffen plan’s logistics promised to complicate matters with 
Belgians.  Historian Van M. Creveld, who attempted to put an end to the question 
of whether the Schlieffen plan would have worked in 1914 based on supply, is 
correct when he claims that the plan required that the roads and rails inside of 
Belgium be used to carry his armies through the territory to stave off exhaustion.3 
These transportation links were essential for the quick movements that would help 
defeat France, as well as alleviating the exigency of returning to the eastern front 
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 before the marching Russian armies could threaten. Because of this reliance, 
Schlieffen feared that Belgium would destroy their transportation systems, which 
would be a major setback for the German army, since it was well attested that 
marching such distances in such a short of a period of time was insuperable. This 
high priority on transportation may have led the Germans into reprisals against 
Belgian citizens in 1914, even if it had been the Belgian army that was 
responsible for destroying pivotal stretches of track.  Their rail sabotage may have 
conditioned the German command into ordering terror tactics, though this theory 
cannot be proved for certain. 
 Another pertinent logistical issue involved feeding the massive armies, 
in which a quarter-million troops were in the right wing of Alexander von Kluck’s 
First Army alone.4  Surprisingly, this seemed to be an oversight on Schlieffen’s 
plan, because a system of supply did not even exist.  He planned for his troops to 
live off the land, bringing the German armies into close contact with the self-
sufficient Belgium locals. Anecdotes about the violent Germans do exist 
according to stories of trying to find food and drink; and, true to their national 
reputation, the German troops may have consumed too much of the local liquor.  
With these few stories as evidence, it can be inferred that not everything in the 
Bryce Report is inaccurate, as some of the testimonies by the German soldiers 
attested to large consumption of wine and champagne. 
 When Germany declared war in 1914, the 1905 Schlieffen plan was still 
relevant.  The reigning chief of staff, Helmuth von Moltke “the younger,” had 
made only a few minor changes to the plan: he turned the German right wing at 
Brussels to avoid breaking neutrality with the Netherlands’, and, in one of his 
more controversial actions, he weakened Schlieffen’s massive right wing by 
reinforcing the left wing.  It was ready to be tested. 
 The German ultimatum was given to Belgium on August 2, 1914, 
requiring free passage through Belgium in return for war reparations and the 
respect of their sovereignty after the war, but the Belgians were unwilling to 
accept these terms.  King Albert, commander of Belgium’s military forces, 
refused the offer and declared war against the German attackers on the fourth of 
August, riling his country to fight for their honor and the benefit of their nearby 
allies, France and Britain. Britain, of course, quickly followed Albert’s 
promulgation, declaring war on Germany. 
 The problem with all of this occurred once the German’s declared that 
Belgian citizens were illegally firing on their troops.  Von Kluck, who was the 
general in charge of the constructed First Army, said in his memoirs that the 
German troops had from the moment they crossed the Belgian borders “suffered 
from treacherous acts on the part of the population, apparently instigated thereto 
by the local authorities.”5  Moreover, Kluck claimed that the violence had 
continued until the southern border of the Belgian frontier, where the illegal 
shooting by civilians “ate into the very vitals of the German army.”6  Not 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 116. 
5 Alexander von Kluck, The March on Paris and the Battle of the Marne, 1914 (New York: 
Longmans, 1920), 25. 
6 Ibid.,  26, 29. 
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 surprisingly, the other side claimed that these were German fabrications.  Now we 
must begin our own inquiry, asking whose claims can be corroborated.  
 It is difficult to attain objective information about what occurred in 
Belgium during the early parts of the war for the reason that newspapers and other 
sources were purposely tendentious. The situation in Belgium was certainly not as 
black and white as these documents would lead one to believe. In fact, one must 
be very skeptical of anything being said because newspaper editors always had 
their nation’s interests in mind.7 It is known that the Germans used terror on the 
civilian population, as can be proved from photography, soldiers’ diaries, and 
confessions made by Belgian citizens and refugees. It is hard to ascertain why or 
how they did so.  Both the Germans and the Allies believed differently, and 
sources such as war newspapers, pamphlets, and books, all stress the enemy’s 
guilt through apocryphal and slippery proofs.  Several of the Western allies’ 
writings on this topic began by claiming that they would indubitably prove 
German war guilt, but the information provided did not empirically support such a 
claim once the sources were consulted. 
 For example, in the war poster collections, such as the published 
German Posters in Belgium, the introduction clearly states that “the photographic 
evidence is irresistible.”8 The book then claims that, “a perusal of this collection 
will serve to illustrate the methods of the barbaric invader” and “[that] it is 
impossible for anyone to remain indifferent to the crimes after further reading.”9 
The claims are tantalizing, but the book fails to produce more than a few proofs of 
German guilt, which leads one to believe that the author wrote out the thesis with 
the hope that the discussion would end with his introduction, and that the lazy 
reader would be fooled by his thesis.  
 The posters continually did the opposite of the editor’s intent by opening 
up, for interpretation, several of the arguments which the Germans were trying to 
make throughout the war.  These posters were the worst hermeneutic quagmires, 
as they left open the debate of whether the Germans were planning to use terror 
against the Belgian populations as a direct plan of action.  For example, von 
Emmich’s first poster on August 4, 1914 says:  
 
I feel the greatest regret that the German troops 
find themselves obliged to cross the frontier of 
Belgium” and that “the destruction of bridges, 
tunnels and railway lines will have to be regarded 
as hostile attacks,” and “We are fighting the 
Belgian army solely in order to force passage into 
France. Or the peaceful population of Belgium is 
not our enemy; on the contrary, and we will treat it 
with understanding for its susceptibilities and with 
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 kindness, provided that, by acts, it gives proof of its 
peaceful sentiments.10 
 
This poster seems to prove that the Germans were willing to avoid terrorizing the 
Belgian population, as long as they allowed the Germans safe passage.  It is hard 
to judge the Germans as monsters based on some of the evidence. 
 As time went on, the posters became more graphic and confrontational. 
They went from saying, “Belgians, you must make your choice,” which meant to 
lay down their arms, to “it was with my consent that the General had the whole 
place burnt down and about one hundred people shot.”11  The posters helped 
explain that the terror occurred once the German officers were fully convinced 
that the entire populace did not plan on stopping their resistance. Officer von 
Bülow, the leader of the German Second Army, illustrates this point by writing in 
one poster that “the inhabitants of the town of Ardenne, after having protested the 
peaceful intentions, made treacherous surprise attacks on our troops.”12 Once it 
was believed that the civilian population was disturbing the German army with 
violence, the Germans began to act differently. 
 The German argument was built around the fact that francs-tireurs, 
which was the name the Germans used for French guerrilla fighters who disregard 
the laws of war, existed inside of Belgium and that the civilian population in 
Belgium had continually shot at the German army. Witnesses in Belgium did 
attest to the fact that the German troops greatly feared the francs-tireurs from the 
war’s outset.13 Indeed, francs-tireurs had been common during the Franco-
Prussian war, especially during the resistance to the terms of the treaty of 
Frankfort 1871.  During this time, the French people began to glorify their 
military, and the francs-tireurs were considered to be national heroes. The 1914 
German military understood how dangerous civilian soldiers could be, a 
pestiferous threat that is amply demonstrated in documents within the appendix of 
the Bryce Report. 
 Kluck said that “firing from behind hedges was an act of daily 
occurrence,” and that “horrible murders of officers and men frequently occurred” 
at the hands of men in civilian clothing.14  He does not seem cognizant that the 
shooters could have been Belgian soldiers in civilian clothing, despite the fact that 
he also argued that the Belgian government had goaded its civilians into shooting 
German soldiers.  Kluck’s writing becomes less reliable when it descends into 
such feverish hyperbole, like his claim that, “the corpses of women were found 
with rifles in their hands who had been killed in the fighting,” or that in a certain 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 2. “C’est à mon plus grand regret que les troupes Allemandes se voient forcées de franchir 
la frontière de la Belgique” et “des destructions de ponts, de tunnels, de voies ferrées devront être 
regardées comme des actions hostiles.” 
11 Ibid., 3, 26. Belges, vous avez à choisir” et “C’est avec mon consentement que le Général en 
chef a fait bruler toute la localité et que cent personnes environ ont été fusillées.” 
12 Ibid., 26. “Les habitants de la ville d’Ardenne, après avoir protesté de leurs intentions 
pacifiques, ont fait une surprise traitre sur nos troupes.” 
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 town – the name of which is not given – the “proclamations had been found in 
which showed that the Belgian government had incited its people to fire on the 
enemy.”15 Just as in 1870, these guerilla fighters were not considered to be 
soldiers by the German military, but rather as obdurate criminals who deserved 
the harshest punishment. 
 Similarly, German fears of francs-tireurs were responsible for why they 
began to use vengeful practices against Belgian citizens. The German command 
inside Belgium believed that using terror could stop civilians from waging 
guerilla warfare, but the opposite seems to have been the case, as Kluck said that 
the Belgian population increased their violence after German reprisals.16 To 
substantiate these actions, the Germans argued that, according to international law 
and the 1907 Second Peace Conference, they had the legal right to shoot any 
francs-tireurs.17  Not to appear as hypocrites, the Germans also claimed 
responsibility for their actions, declaring that any deviant soldiers in their army 
would be prosecuted.  But only two soldiers, who were caught assaulting a 
woman, were sentenced to penal service from the sources consulted. This 
happened to be the only case, of which the Germans knew, in which their soldiers 
had taken advantage of a woman.18 But of course their veracity should be 
questioned for the reason that it would serve their purposes to deny that other 
cases occurred. 
 With this legality in mind, the German command was convinced that 
they had attempted to act appropriately. They felt that they needed to make 
examples out of civilian shooters, and this was how they explained the massacres 
at the medieval town of Louvain, where they incinerated the town to stop sporadic 
shooting.19 The Belgian people firmly denied this firing, and it is not unlikely that 
the firing may have been friendly German fire. But the German soldiers let the 
civilians know that they were being ordered to burn down the city by a German 
high command that was vehemently opposed to any aggression by the francs-
tireurs. 
 The Belgians’ substantiation of their violence was that it had been 
against international law for Germany to have invaded their country in the first 
place.  When compared with the German argument, the scale of neutrality 
infringement seems much more convincing.  Moreover, the Belgium government 
had argued that they had taken measures to warn their people about fighting 
against the German forces, arguing that the whole population would be exposed to 
nameless horrors for criminal behavior against the German enemy.  Indeed, the 
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 Belgian Ministry of the Interior and the communal authorities had told the 
populace not to provoke the German soldiers and, above all, not to resist the 
enemy.20  
 Perhaps most importantly, the Belgian government argued that the 
population had, in fact, not shot at the German army.  They argued that there 
probably had been no francs-tireurs, but rather German soldiers had fired upon 
one another. Essentially, their argument stated that the Germans had fabricated 
the story, because it was likely that skittish soldiers massed together would 
possibly fire upon each other by mistake.  However, the veracity of this claim is 
questionable, as the German Army was one of the best-trained and well-prepared 
armies in the world. So it is highly unlikely that the well-trained German troops 
could have been so clumsy as to shoot upon one another. 
 The Belgians also brandished the argument that the German soldiers had 
been drunk often enough to shoot at one another. The Belgians claimed that “a 
German battalion arrived dragging along with it all sorts of things, particularly 
bottles of wine, and many of the men were drunk.”21 Another written document 
asks the rhetorical question: “Whom could this shot have been fired by?  Was it 
fired by an unnerved sentry, by a drunken soldier, or by a civilian?”22  Here, the 
writer uses the loaded association of the adjective “drunken” in a parallel sentence 
to vilify the Germans, even though he tagged an unmodified civilian onto the end 
of the sentence. 
 The major problem with this argument is that, to the allies’ chagrin, the 
most trained and disciplined army was probably not chronically inebriated. It is 
true that some of the German soldiers’ diaries mentioned heavy drinking, but this 
was rarely found. If more proof can be provided to show that German soldiers 
were often drunk, then it should be concluded that this might have been a cause 
that led them to shoot upon each other. However, until then one should conclude 
that this was probably not the case. 
 Sorting out what occurred in Belgium in 1914 is mostly a matter of 
plausibility.  There are so many holes in both arguments that the historian quickly 
concludes that this gossamer of facts is extremely difficult to disentangle.  It 
should probably be said that there were civilians in Belgium who fired on German 
troops, even if it was just an aberration in normal Belgian behavior. This 
assessment disproves the arguments that were made by the Western allies during 
the conflict that the civilians had never fired on German soldiers, and that the 
latter most likely never shot on their own ranks. 
 As Larry Zuckerman pointed out in Belgium’s case, the Germans never 
prosecuted a single francs-tireur, although Belgian newspapers had admitted to 
rare Belgian firing.23   This confession, however, does not exonerate the French: 
James Morgen Read correctly pointed out in his book, Atrocity Propaganda, that 
evidence does suggest from a postwar investigation that, “Shots were fired at the 
German army from French detachments hidden in Mon-ceau-sur-Sambre at one 
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 point, and in particular the French had secretly used hidden machine gun 
detachments posted on the Sambre Bridge against German troops.”24  This report 
also attested to the fact that newspaper extracts from Belgian papers proved that 
attacks on the German troops by civilian militia had occurred during the first four 
days of the war.25  
 This report, intriguingly enough, also proved that there had been francs-
tireurs in 1914 Belgium. German Red Cross statistics show that one-hundred and 
eight officers and men in the German army had been wounded or killed by 
shotguns during the opening campaign. The likely weapon, the report claims, that 
the francs-tireurs would have used were shotguns, because the Belgian army did 
not use these short-range weapons.26 The report also said that the Germans had 
the international right to shoot at such illegal snipers, but that it was unlawful to 
subject an entire village or town to such punishment in order to remedy the evil of 
the francs-tireurs.27 
 All things considered, the Germans were guilty of many crimes in 
Belgium, but there were only a few instances of perversion that may have 
matched the stories that Bryce was telling.  Read is correct once again when he 
showed that the best evidence indicates that German actions were not always 
characterized by “cruelty and bestiality,” though five thousand civilian deaths 
were recorded during the opening year in Belgium at German hands.28 It is well 
understood from this statistic that many Belgians died in 1914 because of the 
Germans, but the point is that the majority of these deaths occurred in less horrific 
fashion from the way Bryce and Allied nations newspapers led readers to believe.  
On the other side, the Belgians had not committed any egregious acts against the 
German troops in any significant cases in more than a few isolated areas, and the 
shooting by francs-tireurs was most likely to have occurred closer to the invasion 
date rather than during the German campaign. 
 The point of this chapter has been to state that the German armies entered 
Belgium because of the Schlieffen plan, and to explicate what occurred in 
Belgium so as to understand the propaganda within Bryce’s text.  It should also 
have become apparent why the British government would have called for an 
investigation of the outrages. Though the topic had been written upon from the 
time of the invasion, the situation still remained nebulous in the minds of many 
governments.  While the British government seemed to seek an end the myths and 
to provide, once and for all, for an objective viewpoint, in reality, the opposite 
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 would occur, as the committee used its vast resources to build one of the most 
successful propaganda reports of the First World War. 
 
The Bryce Report 
  
 The Bryce report on the Belgium outrages began as a motion from Prime 
Minister Herbert Asquith, who wanted the project completed as quickly as 
possible so that the Germans could not investigate the story before Britain.  He 
devolved the project to Charles F.G. Masterman, the head of British propaganda 
at Wellington House, and, in turn, he was given the duty to appoint a prestigious 
committee.1  Masterman’s prime choice to head the report was James Bryce. He 
knew that Bryce was a venerable scholar, that he was popular in the US from his 
extended stay in Washington, and that he was famous for his historical writings 
on American democracy.2  He also knew that Bryce was well known throughout 
the world, especially in the USA, where the targeted reading audience of the 
report would be. 
 Masterman intended to use the Belgian narrative as propaganda.  His 
propaganda doctrine consisted of two tenets: that keeping the operation covert 
was vital, and that the distribution of the stories would have to be selective, 
because only a certain audience would transmit the narrative in their communities.  
The idea was that it was highly important to influence the opinion of the higher 
classes, because they wielded influence over the lower classes.  Demographically, 
this was a realistic viewpoint, because the top 2.5 percent of British citizens 
controlled 98 percent of the country’s wealth in 1914.3  Moreover, Masterman 
knew that the propaganda had to have some factual basis, and the outrages in 
Belgium appeared to him as the perfect stick around which to spin his 
embellishments.4 
 It seems like he did not have to spend much time convincing Bryce to 
write the report as propaganda.  On January 22, 1915, Masterman asked Bryce to 
head a royal commission to investigate the atrocity reports, an assignment that the 
latter cordially accepted.5 Masterman was also responsible for appointing the rest 
of the committee, which included the men already given in Chapter One.  
Masterman’s instructions to the committee were to undertake a “broad 
investigation of the alleged outrages, the maltreatment of Belgian civilians, and 
which breaches of law were broken by the Germans.”6  
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  To understand why Bryce accepted the job, it must be reiterated that he 
was overwhelmed by nationalism at the war’s outbreak, and appalled by 
Germany’s decision to break their neutrality with Belgium. Though it is true that 
Bryce had close ties with the German nation, he had even closer fraternal ties with 
the British soldiers, and he even claimed, “I would be doing the [British] soldiers 
in the fields a tremendous disservice by injecting fewer violent acts than alleged 
into the report.”7  Once he took over this project, he surmised that he would be 
undermining Britain’s moral justification for going to war if he said that the 
Germans had done nothing violent against Belgian civilians.  With that agenda in 
mind, Bryce ended up writing one of the most successful propaganda reports of 
the First World War. 
 The report’s format was roughly a forty-page synopsis of the events with 
an attached 300-page appendix covering the 1,200 depositions that were collected 
for the committee’s use.  These testimonies were mostly taken from shell-shocked 
refugees living in Britain between January and April of 1915, all of whom had 
claimed to have seen nefarious German behavior.8  These eyewitness accounts 
gave the report additional credence because it let the public have the depositions 
in which the report was based on. They contained dozens of grisly stories of 
alleged execution, torture, rape and mutilation of Belgian women and children.  
Other depositions were taken from British, French, and German soldiers.  The 
German soldiers were not interviewed, though, despite the fact that their diaries 
were used within the appendix as a crucial source.  These were supposedly found 
after the Marne retreat, and were translated in full for their reader’s enjoyment.9 
Not one case of confessed “atrociousness” was in any of these German writings, 
though many narrate the German plundering and the execution of alleged francs-
tireurs.   
 There are several problems with the authenticity of these depositions. 
The committee said that the atrocities had been faithfully reported by 
eyewitnesses and refugees, but this is a problematic claim.10  Bryce and his 
committee did not interview the witnesses personally, since that work was done 
by twenty barristers who worked for the British government. These barristers, of 
course, never put the refugees under oath, which leads to the question of whether 
it is likely that any of their depositions were guided by patriotism, emotional 
excitement, or hysteria.11  Moreover, the report omitted the names of the 
witnesses so that the Germans would not be able to take any further reprisals 
against their family members who may have still been in the occupied zone of 
Belgium.12 On an unrelated problem, the report did not mention whether the 
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 witnesses spoke Flemish or whether their testimonies had been translated.  
Though it is possible that all the witnesses spoke English, it seems odd since 
Flemish and French were almost universally spoken by the Belgian people at this 
time.13  This is evident in the familiarly terse, dramatic prose of the testimonies, 
which shows that the report was constructed from questionable sources. The 
handling of the testimonies helps explain how inaccuracies and exaggerations 
constantly impinged on the text’s credibility. 
 With this copious amount of material in hand, the Bryce committee 
began their report by stating, “There were in many parts of Belgium deliberate 
and systematically organized massacres of the civil population through isolated 
murders and outrages.”14 The report said that the killing took place under the 
orders of military command with deliberate purpose, which may not have been 
true, but the report failed to say what orders were given, or if they were given 
because of firing from francs-tireurs.  
 Alongside these claims, the report simultaneously concluded that there 
was little evidence that the Belgians had commonly fired on the Germany army. 
The report said that the firing was probably fabricated by the German army to 
excuse their behavior.15 As the report states:  
 
The colonel accused the population of firing on the 
soldiers, but there is no reason to think that any of 
them had done so. No evidence whatever seems to 
have been adduced to prove this, and, though there 
may be cases in which individual Belgians fired on 
Germans, the statements that the whole civilian 
population of Belgium was called out is utterly 
false.16  
 
By denying that the francs-tireurs had existed, the Bryce report aimed to make the 
German story no longer seem like a convincing story for their behavior.  The 
report’s denial of francs-tireurs proved to be detrimental in Germany’s cause for 
finding sympathy from neutral nations such as the United States. 
 Besides the denial of francs-tireurs, the report performed an exegesis of 
the murder sprees which had occurred in Belgium, giving accounts of murders in 
towns like Namur, in which the report says, “Troops signalized their entry by 
firing on a crowd of one hundred and fifty unarmed unresisting civilians, ten 
alone who escaped.”17  This example matches up well with the statistics in 
pamphlets, which averred “more than six hundred were killed at Dinant with 
1,200 houses burnt down.”18  But perhaps no story was more successful than the 
story of what occurred in Louvain, in which “massacres, fire, and destruction 
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 went on unheeded. Citizens were shot and others were taken prisoners and 
compelled to go with troops. Soldiers went through the streets yelling, ‘Man hat 
geschossen!’”19  These murder stories were not totally mendacious, since at least 
five thousand Belgian civilians died in the war’s first year, but the report used 
these murders for emotional gain.  In depicting the Germans as savages instead of 
explaining the reasoning behind their actions, the report succeeded in its smearing 
of German international reputation.  
 The most blatant propaganda use was that of ecclesiastical deaths.  As 
the Chicago Tribune reported on the Bryce Report, the “burgomaster’s brother 
and the priest were bayoneted by the Huns.”20 This story was written in the Bryce 
Report more descriptively:  
 
In Belgium large bodies of men sometimes 
including the burgomaster and the priest, were 
seized, marched by officers to a spot chosen for the 
purpose, and there shot in cold blood, without any 
attempt at trial or even inquiry, under the pretence 
of inflicting punishment upon them as the village 
authorities did all in their power to prevent any 
further molestation by the invading force.21  
 
The theme of brutality against priests was developed through the report to induce 
pathos.  The London Times wrote that it was true that German spies had even 
“disguised themselves as priests and were arrested at Gard du Nord.”22 For 
whatever reason, the newspapers enjoyed this story, and they even made a 
“German Crimes” calendar to commemorate a German atrocity on each day of the 
calendar year with the atrocities in Belgium taking up more than two months of 
the dates.23 
 As already seen, another popular story aimed to portray the German 
soldiers as lushes.24 In the report’s appendix, a German soldier named Fritz 
Hollman attested to heavy drinking, saying, “The only good thing is that one need 
not be thirsty [in Belgium or France].  We drank five or six bottles of champagne 
a day.”25 This diary excerpt was one piece of evidence that led Bryce and others 
to assume that the Germans had fired on themselves and that the shooting did not 
come from franc-tireurs. But there is no empirical evidence to back this 
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 assumption. In fact, Hollman wrote nothing about German soldiers shooting upon 
each other.   
 On the other hand, if one read Hollman’s diary further, however, they 
would read about his encounter with a Belgian farmer, who shot at him and other 
German soldiers while they were looking for food. This is solid proof that in at 
least one instance a franc-tireur shot upon German soldiers.  Hollman also said, 
“When we got into a village the people shot at us out of the houses, so we burnt 
the houses, but it is impossible to describe how it looked.”26  Hollman never 
mentions that the German soldiers had fired upon each other, but he does attest to 
the Belgian sharp-shooters, which contradicts the point made by the Bryce report 
which states that their were no shooters in Belgium. 
 Another story narrated that several German soldiers had brutally dragged 
inhabitants out of their houses in an attempt to set them on fire.27  The report 
states that the Germans had used arson whenever they had believed that civilians 
were shooting from certain houses – a plausible scenario – but the report follows 
up on this proposition by reporting that civilians were capriciously dragged out of 
their houses for no particular reason.28 Sometimes it was argued that the Germans 
set houses on fire with the knowledge that people were still occupying it, and then 
shooting at its fleeing inhabitants.29 It was even reported that houses could not be 
extinguished in the ransacking because the fire brigades were forcibly turned 
away by German commanders.30   
 The report’s second major claim asseverated that “women were raped 
and children were brutally murdered.”31  The report’s myriad accounts of rape 
constantly reiterated that these stories were too graphic for description, including 
the rape of virgins, ill treatment of the elderly, and cruelty towards children.32 
Other reports accused the Germans of raping women in the broad daylight, 
totaling fifteen to twenty women in a city’s main square.33  Another report states 
that a girl was violently “dragged out into a field, stripped naked and violated, and 
was killed with a bayonet.”34  In many cases, the victims were handled brutally, 
like a pregnant woman who had two bullets in her breasts and a sword cut on the 
right shoulder.  Stories like these had often been reduced to anatomical atrocities 
in the international press before the Bryce Report was released, as it quoted the 
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 newspapers on their remarks that “a woman’s breasts were cut off after she had 
been murdered.”35 
 Belgian children had been brutally killed as well. The most brutal story 
took place at Haecht, where “several children had been murdered who were two 
or three years old, and one was found nailed to the door of a farmhouse by its 
hands and feet, a crime which seems incredible, but evidence for which we feel 
bound to accept.”36  A German soldier’s words were used for pathos in this 
context, as he was quoted as saying, “I am a father myself, and I cannot bear this. 
It is not war, but butcher!”  Of course, the name of the soldier was not revealed, 
but it demonstrated that these horrible stories were even attested to by German 
soldiers.  This story would cause some to question the report’s legitimacy, but 
very few actually questioned the stories.   
 In addition, the committee imputed several lesser charges to the 
Germans.  They accused them of breaking the laws of warfare by wearing Belgian 
uniforms and abusing the white flag several times, both of which were blatantly 
against the rules of warfare.  Another considerable body of evidence existed in 
reference to the German practice of using civilians, and sometimes military 
prisoners, as screens so that the Belgian troops could not return fire. In this 
regard, there is evidence that proves that the Germans used civilians as shields in 
Belgium, a practice which was also strictly forbidden by international law.  But, 
once again, the Germans argued that the intent of using civilians as shields had to 
do with the safety of German troops against the shooting of the francs-tireurs.37   
 Other lesser charges evoked German jingoism.  Supposedly, the 
Germans humiliated a few of the Belgians by making them recite a discourse 
extolling the greatness and glory of the German Fatherland. Alice Colin’s 
pamphlet, printed during the war, said that, “Many of the murders that occurred 
were said to have happened amidst German battle cries and savage roars such as 
‘Deutschland über alles.’”38 The pamphlet also said that, “With the cries of 
‘Schwein,’ the German soldiers insulted their captives in the grossest manner, spat 
in their faces, and performed acts which do not permit description.”39 The Bryce 
report argued that women were compelled to give three cheers for the Kaiser and 
forced to sing “Deutschland über alles.”40  Finally, the Germans were accused of 
violating the neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium, and crossing the French 
frontier before declaring war.41  Only the former was supported by outside 
evidence. 
 The report’s main conclusion was that the Germans’ murder, rape, arson, 
and pillaging had been ongoing since they crossed the border. The report was 
lopsided in this analysis, since it attempted to prove that the Germans’ arguments 
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 were empirically disproved by Bryce’s inquiry. It concluded that no civilized 
nation had ever acted so brutally in history’s annals, and, more importantly, that 
the francs-tireurs did not exist.  By seemingly disproving their existence, the 
Bryce report was able to argue that the Germans had lied about the existence of 
francs-tireurs in order to hide their thirst for murder and pillaging.  This belief 
was given much credence in the US, where the report would enjoy its largest 
publicity and its most sympathetic audience.  The final section of this article will 
try to explain why. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It never occurred to me that newspapers 
And statesmen could lie. I forgot my pacifism, 
I was ready to believe the worst of the Germans. 
I discounted 20% of the atrocity details as 
Wartime exaggeration. That was not, of course, 
enough.  
– Robert Graves 
  
 Though the last chapter explained the major claims of the Bryce report, 
the goal is now to call into question some of their claims.  The Bryce Commission 
did not produce a dishonest or fraudulent report in the sense that it reached 
conclusions that the evidence had shown to be untrue, but rather its fraudulence 
stems from the fact that it did not verify its evidence.  A major concern with the 
report’s objectivity depends on whether the sources used could reasonably be 
considered accurate. Many critics, such as Sir Roger Casement and Clarence 
Darrow, believed that the interviewed refugees were full of hysteria and war rage, 
and, therefore, contrived stories of German brutality in Belgium. Another valid 
complaint made by the few skeptics was that not a single witness was identified 
by their name in the report.  Bryce’s response to this criticism was that the names 
were not given because the Belgian victims may have had reprisals leveled 
against them.  This may have been the appropriate decision by the committee, 
though, because it was possible that the Germans may have felt vindictive. 
 Initially, the report did have a few skeptics. The first was the Irish poet, 
nationalist, and revolutionary Sir Roger Casement, who is not a surprising pundit 
because during the war he was cooperating with the German government in an 
attempt to arm Ireland.1  Casement argued that the atrocities had not been any 
different from the crimes committed by the English against his nation, or the 
Belgian atrocities in the Congo in 1885 to 1912.2  Somehow, the latter atrocities 
were easily forgotten in 1914 as Lord Northcliffe’s newspapers, the Daily Mail 
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 and The Evening News, raised a vociferous howl against the violation of “poor 
little Belgium,” drowning out the Congo stories.3 
 Another critic was the famous iconoclastic American lawyer, Clarence 
Darrow, who specialized in winning cases for seemingly guilty clients. Darrow’s 
main criticism was that Bryce’s stories about children were absolutely false.  He 
decided to make an extended trip to France in 1915 to prove his point, looking in 
vain for one person who could confirm of even one of Bryce’s stories, but he 
found no success.4  To leave no stone unturned, he even had the temerity to 
announce that he would pay $1,000 to anyone who could produce one Belgian or 
French child whose hands were amputated by a German soldier, but he was not 
surprised when there were no takers to this generous offer.5  Historians have not 
fared much better: there has never been any photographic evidence that shows 
that children had had their hands amputated by German soldiers.  It is believed by 
some that the story may have originated from the Congo atrocities, where children 
had actually had their hands cut off.6  
 These skeptics would have been unsurprised to hear that the report’s 
documents were never found after the war.  In the introduction to the report’s 
appendix it is stated that the original depositions “remain in custody of the Home 
Department, where they would be available in the case of need for reference after 
the conclusion of the war.”7 However, after the war, historians seeking the 
materials were told by the Home Department that the files had mysteriously 
disappeared.  In a letter from B.E. Schmitt, a librarian of the foreign office, to Sir 
Stephen Gagelee on June 22, 1939, Schmitt finally confirmed the loss of the 
documents that the Bryce report promised were in good keeping.8  A tenacious, 
comprehensive search yielded nothing.  This blatant evasion has prompted most 
historians, such as John N. Horne, Larry Zucker, and Thomas Fleming, to dismiss 
99 percent of the Bryce report as having been fabricated. One has even called the 
report “one of the worst atrocities of the war.”9  After the war, the Germans called 
for an objective study of the atrocities, and this time the commission was headed 
by the Belgians themselves.  What the Belgian commission  concluded in 1922 
was that there was little proof that the atrocious acts had occurred as they were 
related in the Bryce report.  For a scholar of Bryce’s caliber, it should have been 
obvious that most of the material was of no real value.  Instead of holding up to 
the high integrity of a historian, he played the role of the propagandist by 
interpolating the false stories in a general condemnation of the German Army. 
The harshness of this claim comes from the fact that historians have a 
responsibility to be disciplined and objective in their work. Bryce’s report was a 
betrayal of a historians raison d’être. 
 Despite the fact that it was highly insidious propaganda, the Bryce 
Report was influential in shaping public opinion. The Germans played a key role 
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 in this success because they had provided the propaganda material in the first 
place, as well as a slew of other outrages which seemed to corroborate the report.  
Their use of poisonous gases, Zeppelin raids, U-boat sinkings, and a government 
led by their warlike Kaiser all led to the general reputation of Germans being both 
cruel and savage. 
 Perhaps more importantly, the Germans were completely blind-sided by 
the importance of propaganda in the First World War, particularly as an important 
measure to control the minds of their own people to mobilize support for the war, 
to find recruiting for their military, and to initiate a common goal against a hated 
enemy.  The First World War was a unique war because it was the first 
industrialized war between the great powers of Europe. This meant that the home 
front and the control of opinion were just as vital to success as the armies out in 
the field.  The obvious point is that the morale within the circles of the home front 
was vital to stave off calls for a solution to the conflict. The other was that a 
nation’s manufacturing capability played a vital role in keeping soldiers out in the 
field. It has been said that for each soldier in the field, there had to be one person 
working in a factory.  
 The Germans did make an attempt to disprove the stories told within the 
Bryce Report, but they never attained Bryce’s creditability.  Their rebuttal to the 
Bryce report was entitled The German White Book, but its effectiveness was far 
less than the Bryce report because it cost ten marks.  Much of its publishing 
problems resulted from the fact that the Germans could never match Wellington 
House’s connections within the US to distribute the pamphlet; Thomas Fleming is 
correct in pointing out that the leaders of the British War Propaganda Bureau had 
several friends within America’s journalist circles.10  In addition, the Bryce report 
owed much of its success as a propaganda pamphlet because it was translated into 
twenty-seven languages, while Wellington House worked overtime to see that the 
White Book would never be printed in neutral countries and given a fair hearing. 
 Therefore, the Germans were unable to rebuke the Bryce report or even 
cross-examine its witnesses.  Furthermore, their attempts to counter with their 
own propaganda all failed because many of the neutrals had already made up their 
minds about Germany’s war guilt.  Bryce’s report aided in portraying the war as 
one of right versus wrong, and much of this can be seen in the writing of the 
London Times, which claimed that the war was a “holy crusade for the law of 
nations.”11 The Germans tried to evoke sympathy with a report on the monstrous 
deeds of the Russians on the Eastern Front, but these stories did not receive even 
an iota of sympathy.12  When attempting to invent successful propaganda ideas, 
Berlin’s early efforts were pathetic. 
 Bryce’s report was a huge propaganda victory for Britain and its allies.  
It convinced millions of Americans and other neutrals that the Germans were 
beasts masquerading as humans. Furthermore, the Bryce Report may have been 
responsible for distorting the history of the Belgian atrocities, because most of 
what was written on the Belgium topic before the 1930s hedged its footnotes too 
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 heavily on such atrocity reports.  The staying power of the report alone meant that 
it was partly responsible for turning the world against Germany and turning them 
into pariahs.  Many believed in 1914 that they had been the most militaristic 
nation, though it was always overlooked that other great powers had displayed 
just as much of a love for military glory as Germany. For instance, French 
Nationalists had been supporting their nation’s arms buildups for years, and most 
of their politicians were obsessed with winning the military arms race against 
their rival. France itself was determined to erase the strain of their crushing defeat 
by Germany in 1870-71 and the loss of their northern territories, Alsace and 
Lorraine.13 Though the report was certainly a misguided enquiry into the 
outrages, it still had a massive impact upon the history of thought during the First 
World War.  
                                                
 The report’s success can also be measured by its impact on the United 
States. Read pointed out that Northcliffe’s Daily Mail reported that the Bryce 
report had an “overwhelming effect on the American mind and heart,” and its 
effect was only outmatched by the story of the sinking of the Lusitania.14  In fact, 
the Bryce report owes much of its success in the US to the sinking of the 
Lusitania, because the report was released just six days afterward.15 Some 
historians have argued that the printing of the Bryce report was to capitalize on 
the publicity of the sinking, but there is no empirical evidence to back this claim, 
since the document was finished several weeks before it was published and was 
sent out to the US for its release on May 13, 1915.16 What can be said with 
certainty, however, is that Wellington House and the story of the Lusitania turned 
US opinion against Germany in thought, word, and deed. 
 The report owed much of its US success to its widespread reporting 
through America’s 20,000 newspapers,17 where it received its widest circulation 
and its profoundest influence. When the report was released on May 13, 
Wellington House had already seen to it that the report would go to virtually 
every major US newspaper.  On the same day, the New York Times wrote that 
proof had been given that “German soldiers were guilty of cruel and dreadful 
atrocities in the report of the Bryce commission in which we publish today.”  The 
headline of the story read: “GERMAN ATROCITIES ARE PROVED, FINDS 
BRYCE COMMITTEE.”18  
 The New York Times had noted that James Bryce was the report’s 
chairman and that his prestige as a historian removed all skepticism. The report 
even overruled the commentaries from US reporters stationed in Belgium, who 
claimed that stories of the atrocities were groundless.  In fact, several of the 
newspapers covering the Bryce report began their articles by establishing Bryce’s 
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 untarnished and unquestionable credibility, which garnered the report its 
tremendous respect. Even Irish newspapers in the US – the perennial foe of 
Britain – did not make the slightest attempt to impinge on the correctness of the 
facts alleged in the report. 
 Its credibility was easily won in Britain as well, where the British 
newspaper The Independent wrote:  
 
In village after village non-combatants by hundreds, 
without discrimination of age or sex, have been put 
to death, often with fiendish torture, without so 
much as the shadow of evidence of any guilt to 
condemn them; little children and the aged have 
been butchered like cattle in shambles; women of 
every age from young girlhood up have been 
ravished.19   
 
British reporting was similar to the US reports, since the citizens of both countries 
believed that not a building in Belgium still stood, that the country’s seven million 
people wore rags, and that they begged for their food each day.20  
 Furthermore, Bryce’s friends were well aware of his impartiality of mind 
and his judicial temperament, and they were convinced from his report to start a 
campaign against Germany.21 The Morgan partners officially said that, “In 
America there are 50,000 people who understand the necessity of entering the war 
on England’s side, but there are one-hundred million Americans who have not 
even thought of it. Our task is to see that those figures are reversed.”22  
 Little did the Morgan brothers realize that US political opinion had 
already turned against Germany. Opinion had soured in the previous decade 
because of their desire to aid Spain in its war against the US, and the US also 
accused Germany of attempting to create international friction during US 
negotiations with Columbia in regards to the construction of the Panama Canal.23 
Among other accusations, US papers argued that Germany hated democracy and 
that it would work to quell its influence. 
 The influence of the Belgium atrocities can also be seen in America’s 
willingness to provide charity to the country.  All Americans knew that Germany 
was the aggressive giant, and that “poor Belgium” was small and weak, leading to 
the building up of American sympathy.  The New York Times reported that the 
charity had been admirable and the liberality shown by the US people was 
honorable.24 Furthermore, in 1915, the British government sent Mme. 
Vandervelde to the US to collect donations, where, to prove the country’s 
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 kindness, she collected $300,000 for Belgium relief.25  It has been noted that US 
wartime contributions, headed by Iowa’s Herbert Hoover, had kept the Belgian 
people from starving, and that the US government was even generous enough to 
offer up tracts of land in the south and in the west to be used as Belgian 
settlements – a response to the displacement of 1.5 million Belgians during the 
war.26  Clearly, the Americans deeply cared about the plight in Belgium. 
 Still, how much the propaganda report affected US opinion is difficult to 
judge: the US did not enter the war until April 2, 1917, which means that the 
report’s effect was not enough to bring the US military into the war.  What the 
report probably accomplished was that it changed the minds of Americans against 
Germans.  US opinion had soured against Germany during their years in 
neutrality, and the report did much to put the US on a mental disposition in which 
they favored Britain and its allies. 
 The report’s success can also be measured from the broad outlook that 
men like Masterman and Bryce were able to weaken Germany’s cause, which 
may have been responsible for shortening the war and saving lives.27  It must be 
reiterated that one reason why the Allies won was that American soldiers had 
flooded into Europe by 1918, which demolished German morale and ended the 
war. Though it is always difficult to measure public opinion, the Bryce report may 
also have injured Germany’s morale within its army or on its home front. A quote 
from the German General Erich von Ludendorff may drive home the point, as he 
wrote in his memoirs that during the war “Germany [was] hypnotized by the 
enemy propaganda as a rabbit is by a snake.”28 If this is true, than the propaganda 
Bryce report played a role in undermining Germany’s war effort.   
 In conclusion, Bryce wrote the report as propaganda because he knew 
that his countrymen were in battle, and that Germany could be accused with 
impunity because they could not speak on their own behalf or cross-examine the 
evidence produced against them. A historian of his ability should not have been so 
biased in the writing of the report, even though he and his biographer, H.A.L. 
Fisher, were unwilling to admit that they had served as official propagandists.  
Bryce held the belief that the war was a struggle between ideals – the ideal of 
German militarism, and the rule of law with peaceful communities dwelling in 
tranquility. Merely the fact that the interests of the latter were concomitant with 
Britain’s interests was enough to make him write the report. Even Bryce was 
capable of being swayed by patriotic exigencies. 
 Furthermore, Bryce and his colleagues were probably surprised by the 
worldwide appeal that their report received just because it was signed by an 
eminent historian. The committee seemed either unable or unwilling to 
acknowledge or even apologize for the half-truths that they created.  In the 
report’s defense, Bryce had explicitly mentioned at the report’s outset that “upon 
trial was not the German nation, but the ruthlessness of the methods employed by 
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the German military’s conduct of the war in Belgium.”29 However, his warning 
was ignored by the press, and the readers of his report obviously did not heed his 
advice, because his report sparked great hate against the German nation. 
 On a final note, the wartime French and Belgian investigations arrived at 
similar conclusions, but all three post-war commissions failed to substantiate most 
of the allegations that were written in the Bryce report.30 The atrocities in 
Belgium were exaggerated through propaganda, but that does not detract from the 
people who actually did die in Belgium during the occupation of the First World 
War.  Burnings, destruction, and murder did occur in 1914 through a general 
campaign of German terrorism. The historical revision that needs to be noted is 
that the atrocities in Belgium were perhaps not as barbaric as the Entente Allies 
had portrayed them during the war.  
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